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Abstract
We present evidence on the trading and performance impact of buy-side analysts.
Using data provided by a large global asset manager, we relate buy-side analysts’
recommendations to fund transactions on a daily basis. We show that buy-side
analysts signiﬁcantly inﬂuence trading decisions: Fund managers strongly follow re-
cent recommendation revisions, even after controlling for other trading determinants.
Positive abnormal returns to buy-side analysts’ revisions are also reﬂected in the per-
formance of mutual fund trades: Trades triggered by buy-side recommendations have
higher returns than other trades. Overall, the impact of buy-side analysts is more
pronounced than that of sell-side analysts.
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1 Introduction
The asset management industry is responsible for a large amount of capital invested on
behalf of its clients: Globally, $ 53.4 trillion – almost 110% of world GDP – were under
management in 2006, $ 24.3 trillion invested in equities alone.1 Professional money man-
agers rely on various sources of information in order to guide their investment decisions.
In equity markets, sell-side analysts employed by brokerage ﬁrms and investment banks
as well as analysts employed by independent research providers are a prominent source of
information. However, investment management ﬁrms also employ their own so-called buy-
side analysts as an internal source of investment ideas. Although less visible than sell-side
analysts, these internal analysts account for a signiﬁcant share of the overall spending on
equity research: According to the advisory ﬁrm Tabb Group (2006), US and UK asset
managers spent $ 7.7 billion on internal and $ 7.1 billion on external research in 2006. In
the period 2000 to 2002, US equity funds’ self-reported weight put on in-house analysts
averages 73% to 75% (see Cheng, Liu, and Qian, 2006). While sell-side analysts have been
analyzed with scrutiny by investors, regulators and academics (see Boni and Womack,
2003), buy-side analysts have received far less attention. Little is known about the im-
pact of these internal analysts relative to external analysts in money managers’ investment
process so far.
We empirically analyze how the information provided by buy-side analysts aﬀects the in-
vestment decisions of professional money managers. Speciﬁcally, we approach the following
questions: To what degree do managers follow their in-house analysts’ recommendations?
To what degree do they follow the recommendations issued by sell-side research analysts,
which represent public information in the market? What are the performance implications
of this behavior? Answers to these questions provide evidence on the value of internal
analysts as an important organizational aspect of many asset management ﬁrms. To ad-
dress them, we use a proprietary data set from a large, globally active asset management
ﬁrm. The data is – to our knowledge – unique in its details. We observe in-house analyst
recommendations and changes therein as well as fund positions, transactions and money
ﬂows on a daily basis for a set of European equity mutual funds between 2004 and 2007.
Our results show that buy-side analysts (BSAs) have a statistically and economically
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the trading behavior of fund managers. Buy transactions coincide
largely with more favorable internal stock recommendations: The direction of trades in a
1Estimates by the World Bank and the Boston Consulting Group (2007).
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stock matches those of a prior recommendation change in almost 90% of the cases during the
week following the new recommendation. Even after controlling for other trading inﬂuences
(most notably fund ﬂows and sell-side recommendations), we ﬁnd that, for example, recent
recommendation upgrades (downgrades) induce a same-directional increase (decrease) in
the probability of a stock purchase of 52 (24) percentage points. This eﬀect is considerably
larger than the eﬀect of sell-side analysts (SSAs) on transactions.
The relative impact of BSAs and SSAs is consistent with the two types of analysts pro-
viding fund managers with, respectively, private and public investment signals. Investors
receiving both types of signals react more strongly to the private signal.2 Public signals
will be more reﬂected in stock prices than private ones as a larger set of investors observe
and responds to public signals. As the investor’s private signal is revealed less in prices,
his response to this signal should be stronger (unless its precision is too low). Our ﬁndings
reﬂect this diﬀerential reaction to public and private signals.
The analysis of returns to recommendation revisions and fund manager transactions
suggests that BSAs also positively impact trading performance for our sample funds. Rec-
ommendation upgrades by BSAs yield positive abnormal returns while downgrades show
negative abnormal returns. The diﬀerence in returns is about 2.0 percentage points over
a one month horizon. Similarly, fund transactions around recommendation revisions yield
positive abnormal return diﬀerences of 1.8 to 2.0 percentage points for holding periods of
one to two months. More importantly, these transactions yield higher return diﬀerences
than transactions that either occur around SSA revisions or that cannot be attributed to
analyst revisions. The transaction impact of BSAs thus also leads to a positive performance
impact for our sample funds.
There exists a signiﬁcant strand of the literature analyzing research analysts and their
value for investments. Most of the empirical contributions here focus on the ability, be-
havior and incentives of SSAs (see e.g. Womack, 1996; Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and
Trueman, 2001; Irvine, 2004; Ivkovic and Jegadeesh, 2004; Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and
Lee, 2004; Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman, 2007; Mokoaleli-Mokoteli, Taﬄer, and Agarwal,
2009; Fang and Yasuda, 2013). Given the private nature of the data, there is hardly any
empirical work on BSAs. The papers by Groysberg, Healy, and Chapman (2008), Groys-
berg, Healy, Serafeim, and Shanthikumar (2013), and Gray, Crawford, Price, and Johnson
2To have some investment value, the “public” signal needs to be imperfectly observable, e.g. due to
liquidity trades (see e.g. Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Kyle, 1985). Kacperczyk and Seru (2007) and Chen
and Wilhelm (2012) provide models incorporating private and public signals.
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(2012) are notable exceptions. Groysberg et al. (2008, 2013) use proprietary data from a
US asset management ﬁrm in order to compare recommendations and earnings estimates
by BSAs and SSAs. They show that earnings estimates by BSAs are less precise than
those by SSAs (Groysberg et al., 2008). Similarly, the investment value of BSA recom-
mendations seems lower than the value of the sell-side recommendations (Groysberg et al.,
2013). However, Groysberg et al. (2013) show that the latter diﬀerence is attributable to
diﬀerences in buy-side and sell-side coverage. Once this diﬀerence is taken into account,
their results suggest no performance diﬀerence between the two analyst groups.
Our results on analyst recommendation performance are quite similar to those of Groys-
berg et al. (2013), with BSA recommendations performing even slightly better than SSAs
based on a sample of stocks covered by both groups. However, rather than comparing
the analyst groups, our contribution is in identifying the performance eﬀect of analyst rec-
ommendations as reﬂected in mutual fund trades. As BSA recommendations are private
information, it is only through these trades that their value is realized.
Gray et al. (2012) analyze the value of recommendations by BSAs from a large set of
(hedge) funds, issued on a social network targeted to investment professionals. They ﬁnd
that recommendations publicized have investment value, but that fund managers front-run
these recommendations. As we are able to relate recommendations and trades on a daily,
and thus more timely basis, our paper speciﬁcally shows how closely BSA recommendations
are followed by fund managers and how this creates value in fund portfolios.
Another strand of related literature analyzes the investment behavior of money man-
agers, speciﬁcally the role of public and private information for fund managers. Contribu-
tions in this strand are either theoretical (see e.g. Kyle, 1989; Chen and Wilhelm, 2012),
focus on public information (e.g. Busse, Green, and Jegadeesh, 2012; Franck and Kerl,
2013), or try to infer the use of private information indirectly (see e.g. Cheng et al., 2006;
Kacperczyk and Seru, 2007; Pomorski, 2008). Both Busse et al. (2012) (for the US) and
Franck and Kerl (2013) (for Europe) show that fund managers’ trades are aﬀected by revi-
sions in SSA recommendations. In addition, the results by Franck and Kerl (2013) suggest
that by following these revisions, fund managers realize positive returns.
Kacperczyk and Seru (2007) ﬁnd that US fund managers follow the sell- side to dif-
ferent degrees. However, their results show that fund managers whose portfolio changes
are less correlated with SSA recommendations have better fund performance. The authors
attribute this to higher manager skills which yield better private information (or private
interpretation of public signals). Typically, BSAs are an important source of such informa-
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tion. Cheng et al. (2006) analyze the role of BSAs by using funds’ self-reported weight put
on internal research. Analyzing fund performance, they ﬁnd some evidence that higher use
of BSAs yields higher fund performance. Being able to directly link BSA revisions and fund
manager transactions for the ﬁrst time, we show that BSAs do indeed provide important
and valuable information to fund managers. And although speciﬁc sets of relevant SSAs
also have positive trading and performance impact, BSAs can be shown to have a larger
impact.
Overall, our paper adds to the existing literature by bridging the above strands of
the literature. We provide further evidence on the value of BSA versus SSA revisions,
and, more importantly, how this value is reﬂected in fund manager behavior and trading
performance. Our analysis thus represents a ﬁrst step in quantifying the role of buy-side
analysts in the return generating process. The value of relying on internal analyst teams is
an important determinant for the organization of asset management activities. Similarly,
our paper is also relevant for fund investors gauging the beneﬁts of choosing asset managers
with internal research capabilities (at potentially higher management cost).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our data set. In section 3, we
analyze the impact of BSAs and SSAs on the trading behavior of fund managers. Section 4
then considers analysts’ performance impact. Section 5 estimates the value generated by
BSAs for the asset management ﬁrm. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data and sample
2.1 Data
The analysis combines data from both public and private sources. A global asset man-
agement ﬁrm which belongs to the top ten global asset managers in terms of assets under
management is the main data provider. From one of their European oﬃces, we obtained a
rich set of information on their mutual funds and buy-side analysts. This data is augmented
by stock and sell-side analyst information from Thomson Reuters.
Sample funds: We use a sample of 14 equity funds investing in European equities be-
tween June 2004 and December 2007. All these funds are managed by individual fund
managers who belong to the ﬁrm’s European equities team. Managers of a fund can
change over time. Most fund managers also manage institutional equity portfolios. Al-
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though information on these portfolios is not included, these institutional portfolios share
the basic strategy in terms of equity investments. The fund data used thus proxies the full
spectrum of investment strategies in European equities pursued by the company.
The daily information we use includes all trades undertaken within the funds, all fund
investment positions, and net money ﬂows into or out of these funds. We also obtained
basic fund information such as the ID of the fund manager, the fund benchmark relevant
for fund manager evaluation as well as changes in any of this information during the sample
period. We supplement this data with daily fund prices and benchmark returns.
Averaged over funds and days, we observe portfolios consisting of 58 diﬀerent stocks
and an average of 4.5 trades on any day that funds trade at least one stock. As our data
comes from a large asset management ﬁrm, the sample funds’ size is also large, relative to
other funds. Table 1 provides information collected from Morningstar on the positioning of
the sample funds relative to the set of funds belonging to their respective fund category.3
As can be seen from the assets under management, seven of our sample funds are in the
top two quintiles of their respective fund category. Similarly, the management costs of
the sample funds are also mostly in the upper quintiles. On the other hand, within their
categories, our sample funds are quite diverse in terms of their investments with regard to
ﬁrm size (all funds are generally classiﬁed as large-cap funds). In terms of their performance
within their fund categories, our sample funds show some diversity, with more funds in the
lower percentiles than in the upper percentiles. Parts of this performance structure could
be explained by the generally larger fund size as well as the higher management costs (see
e.g. Berk and Green, 2004; Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik, 2004).
Analyst recommendations: Internal stock recommendations originate from two groups
of analysts, research analysts and small cap fund managers. The main task of the latter
group is to manage small cap equity portfolios but they also give stock recommendations
for a subset of the stocks they invest in. Research analysts are sector specialists who
follow stocks in the sector of their expertise. These analysts very much resemble SSAs and
sometimes worked for the sell-side previously or move to the sell-side later on. The job of a
research analyst in our sample ﬁrm has a career path of its own. These analysts are hence
3Morningstar classiﬁes funds according to their investment focus and style. These fund categories
include, for example, Europe Large-Cap Blend Equity, Europe Large-Cap Growth Equity, or Eurozone
Large-Cap Equity. The information was collected in October 2008 and was only available for 13 of our 14
sample funds as one sample fund was closed during the year 2007.
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no junior analysts who will be fund managers in the future. Although a few analysts also
manage sector portfolios, their role as analyst is never secondary. Stock recommendations
are analysts’ key output and a major determinant for analysts’ performance evaluation
and hence remuneration. Another task of the research analysts is to discuss their views
and industry/company news with fund managers. Although research analysts have their
own company models, unlike SSAs they are not required to provide earnings estimates on
a regular basis.
We use information on recommendations for European stocks issued by all internal
research analysts (rather than small cap fund managers for whom recommendations are
not the main aspect of their job). This implies that stocks analyzed are predominantly
larger cap stocks, but this is also true for the stocks our sample mutual funds invest in.
The daily information contains the stock, an analyst ID, and the current recommendation.
Analyst stock recommendations are coded 1 for “sell”, 2 for “underperform”, 3 for “hold”,
4 for “buy”, and 5 for “strong buy”. Changes in recommendations are recorded in the data
set for the same day as the analyst announces the change if this occurs before the market
opens. Else, they are recorded as of the subsequent trading day. These timing conventions
are also used in the internal evaluation of the analysts.
For each stock traded by one of the sample funds, we collect SSA recommendations from
the Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S database. These recommendations are originally coded in
the opposite direction of the buy-side recommendations (from 1 for “strong buy” to 5 for
“sell”) and are recoded by us to match the buy-side structure. A higher recommendation
in our data thus implies a more favorable view of the stock for both BSAs and SSAs. We
use the daily mean consensus recommendation for each stock as well as I/B/E/S detail
information for individual analysts’ recommendations.
As the market consensus in many stocks is determined by a large number of SSAs,
professional investors may decide not to pay attention to all recommendation revisions
issued. Rather, some SSAs or brokerage ﬁrms might be followed more closely than others.
We consequently also consider a sub-set of sell-side ﬁrms by identifying the key brokerage
ﬁrms for our sample ﬁrm. We measure the relevance of a sell-side ﬁrm for our sample
ﬁrm by the overlap between the stocks traded by the mutual funds and stocks covered
by the sell-side ﬁrm. Hence, sell-side brokers which cover a higher number of stocks that
were also traded by our sample funds are deemed more important. We rank all brokers
covered in the I/B/E/S detail database and consider only the top 10 brokers in this ranking.
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Analysts employed by these 10 brokers will be termed key SSAs.4 Recommendation levels
and revisions (excluding recommendation reiterations) by key SSAs are then used in the
analysis.
Table 2 presents some information about the structure of BSA recommendations and
contrasts it with key SSAs’ recommendations. The table shows the distribution of recom-
mendations, the mean recommendation as well as the number of recommendations issued
and analysts employed over the sample period 2004 to 2007. For key SSAs, the ﬁgures are
ﬁrst aggregated at the level of the sell-side ﬁrm, and then averaged separately for ﬁrms
ranked 1 to 5 as well as ﬁrms ranked 6 to 10 in terms of coverage overlap. Only stocks
actually held by the mutual funds during the sample period are included in the table, with
the ﬁnal row providing the (average) number of stocks used. Even with this restricted set
of stocks, the table shows that the key sell-side ﬁrms cover more stocks, employ more ana-
lysts, and issue more recommendations than the buy-side ﬁrm’s analysts, as seems typical
for the industry (Groysberg et al., 2008, 2013).
Diﬀerences in the distribution of recommendations between BSAs and key SSAs, on the
other hand, are not very pronounced, with very similar mean recommendations or propor-
tions of neutral recommendation. Comparisons of the distribution of votes is complicated
by the fact that some sell-side ﬁrms do not use the full spectrum of recommendation levels.
For example, one of the key sell-side ﬁrms does not employ hold recommendations, whereas
others might not use the extreme recommendations sell or strong buy. This does not aﬀect
our subsequent analyses as we later only consider the direction of recommendation changes
(revisions) by key SSAs, rather than the recommendation levels.
Earnings estimates: Although the consensus recommendation is an easily observable
and hence prominent indicator, professional investors might consider alternative investment
signals to be more important, not least because SSAs may provide biased investment
recommendations (see Malmendier and Shanthikumar, 2007, 2013). We therefore also
include I/B/E/S information about SSAs’ earnings estimates. Speciﬁcally, we calculate
earnings revisions as the relative change in the consensus earnings estimate over a speciﬁed
period. In order to have a rolling measure of the consensus earnings, we use a time-
weighted average of the earnings estimates for FY1 and FY2. The weighting factor for the
4We also considered diﬀerent sets of key SSAs by including the top 3, 5 or 20 sell-side ﬁrms. Our results
and conclusions are robust to these variations. In section 4.3, we also analyze the impact of a set of SSAs
selected based on reputation rather than coverage.
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FY1 estimate is the number of trading days until the reporting date of the FY1 earnings
relative to the number of trading days between the reporting days for FY1 and FY2. The
weighting factor for FY2 is then 1 minus the factor for FY1.5 By this weighting structure,
FY1 estimates receive a lower weighting the closer the corresponding reporting date.
2.2 Transaction analysis sample
Our main analysis on the trading impact of BSAs is a logit regression of the sign of a trans-
action on a set of internal and external variables. For this analysis, we match daily trades
at the stock/fund level with buy-side recommendations and fund cash ﬂows as internal
variables, and with sell-side information (consensus recommendations and earnings as well
as key SSA revisions) and stock returns as external variables. Table 3 provides descriptive
statistics for the transactions sample, and Table 4 presents within-sample correlations. In
a subsequent analysis, we will also look at the impact of the same set of external variables
on the sign of BSA revisions.
The dependent variable in the trading analysis, Buy transactiont, is an indicator variable
which takes on a value of 1 if a transaction is a buy and a value of 0 for a sell transaction,
with t being the day of the transactions. All independent variables are deﬁned relative
to this day, where level variables are measured on the same day while dynamic variables
(changes or ﬂows) are included for several, non-overlapping time periods. For example,
BSA recommendationt measures the BSA recommendation level of the stock on the day
of the transaction.6 BSA recommendation revisiont+1,t−1 is a signed indicator variable
which takes on values of -1, 0, or 1 if the BSA recommendation has been, respectively,
lowered, unchanged, or increased in the period of one day prior to one day after the
transaction.7 We similarly consider revisions during the remainder of the preceding week
5In case one of the FY estimates is missing, the available earnings forecast receives a weight of 1. In
addition, as ﬁrms’ reporting dates might change over time, we restrict weights to be within the interval
[0, 1].
6We note that the mean BSA recommendation in Table 3 is slightly higher than the mean BSA recom-
mendation in Table 2. The two values diﬀer as Table 3 reports the mean recommendation for every stock
transaction, while the mean in Table 2 refers to all unique recommendations issued by BSAs.
7We include the day after the transactions in order to account for fund managers receiving information
about planned revisions by the BSAs. Limiting this variable to prior and same-day revisions does not aﬀect
our results qualitatively. We also disregard the level of recommendation revisions, as over 90% of revisions
are single-level changes. Unreported regressions using information about the level of recommendation
changes do not yield further distinctive eﬀects.
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(BSA recommendation revisiont−2,t−5) and changes that happened up to a month earlier
(BSA recommendation revisiont−6,t−20).8
Cash ﬂows are measured in percentage relative to a fund’s daily assets under manage-
ment. We calculate the sum of cash ﬂows over a set of days, diﬀerentiating by whether
they were reported on the same or previous day as the trade (Cash Flowt,t−1) or during the
remainder of the preceding trading week (Cash Flowt−2,t−5). Since cash ﬂows have a very
immediate eﬀect on the portfolio structure, we do not consider cash ﬂows which occurred
over a week ago.
Among the external variables, recommendation revisions by key SSAs are deﬁned very
similarly to BSA revisions: Key SSA recommendation revisiont,t−1 is a signed indicator with
values -1 or 1 if an analyst by one of the key sell-side ﬁrms downgrades or, respectively,
upgrades the stock on the day of or one day prior to the transaction, and with value 0
else. As with BSA revisions, we consider key SSA revisions during the remainder of the
preceding week and the remainder of the preceding month.9
For consensus variables (recommendations and earnings) and returns, we allow for a
potentially longer lag for them to aﬀect transactions. Consensus recommendations are
included both with the level on the trading day (Cons. recommendationt) and with the
changes therein over three sub-periods: for the week prior to the transaction (from t− 5 to
t), for the remainder of the preceding month (from t−20 to t−6), as well as for months two
to six (from t−120 to t−21) before the transaction.10 The same three sub-periods are used
for earnings revisions (variables denoted Cons. earnings revision). These are measured as
the percentage change in the weighted earnings forecast, calculated as the change in the
forecast relative to the absolute value of the forecast, thus taking into account potentially
negative earnings forecasts. We also winsorize the earnings revision variable to ±100% in
order to remove extreme values arising from earnings close to zero.11
8We denote 5 trading days as one week, and 20 trading days as one month.
9In case of more than one key SSA revising their recommendation during any of these periods, we use
the sign of the diﬀerence between the number of upgrades and downgrades.
10Including both key SSA revision indicators as well as overall consensus revisions over the week and
month preceding the transactions potentially gives rise to collinearity issues (we are grateful to a reviewer
for pointing this out). While there exists a positive correlation between the variables (as can be seen from
Table 4), the correlation coeﬃcients are not overly high (the maximum correlation is 0.19). To ensure
robustness of our results, we have repeated our analyses by deriving a key SSA consensus (and changes
therein) from the I/B/E/S detail ﬁles and adjusting the consensus variables to exclude those key SSA
recommendations. The (unreported) results are comparable to the results presented in the paper.
11Winsorizing the three earnings revisions variables at their respective 1st and 99th percentiles yields
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We include past return information over periods very similar to the consensus variables,
with the only diﬀerence being that the prior week return (Returnt−1,t−5) uses the percent-
age change in closing prices until the day before the transactions, whereas the consensus
variables include changes occurring on the transaction day. We thus assume that recom-
mendation or earnings revisions are available already during the trading day, while closing
prices, by deﬁnition, are not.12
3 Transaction impact
In this section, we consider the impact of BSA and SSA recommendations on the trading
behavior of fund managers. In the ﬁrst step, we look at the structure of transactions
around buy-side recommendation changes. We then turn to a more thorough analysis of
the determinants of trading decisions and BSA revisions.
3.1 Recommendations and the structure of transactions
If BSA recommendations matter for fund managers’ investment decisions, we should ex-
pect to see changes in their behavior when recommendations are changed. Over the sample
period, we observe 668 recommendation changes. Table 5 (Panel A) presents the distri-
bution of these revisions in a transition matrix. The table shows the distribution of new
recommendations by the prior recommendation level. The last column in Panel A gives
the percentage of recommendation revisions by the prior recommendation level.13 Recom-
mendation reiterations are not recorded for the buy-side analysts in the sample. Hence,
the main diagonal of the transition matrix is empty.
The numbers in Panel A show that most of the recommendations by buy-side analysts
are either a hold (recommendation of 3) or a buy (recommendation of 4). Over 76% of
recommendation revisions start at these levels, and the transitions are also mostly towards
these levels. Only very few recommendations originate from or target the lowest recom-
very similar results.
12Excluding same-day recommendation and earnings revisions does not materially aﬀect our results.
13We note that the distribution in the ﬁnal column of Table 5, Panel A, slightly diﬀers from the dis-
tribution of BSA recommendations presented in Table 2. The diﬀerence arises because Table 2 reports
the distribution of all recommendations, whereas the distribution in Table 5 captures all recommendations
that are subsequently revised. Hence, the ﬁnal recommendation levels for each stock are missing in the
distribution shown in Table 5.
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mendation level. Additionally, the transition matrix shows that most recommendation
revisions are single level changes. In later analyses, we will therefore neglect the size of
recommendation changes and simply diﬀerentiate between upgrades and downgrades.
Panel B of Table 5 illustrates the distribution of buy versus sell transactions in stocks
when these stocks’ recommendations change. Speciﬁcally, the table reports the proportion
of buy transactions among all transactions in a stock within the period starting one trading
day prior to the recommendation change and ending one trading day afterwards. These
buy proportions are averaged and presented for the same recommendation transitions as
in Panel A. The results show that upgrades (numbers above the main diagonal) and down-
grades (numbers below the main diagonal) go along with very diﬀerent trading behavior:
Upgrades are accompanied mostly by buy transactions, whereas sell transactions dominate
for recommendation downgrades. As an example, consider an initial hold recommendation
(level of 3). For the 65.3% of stock upgrades to a buy recommendation (recommendation
level 4, see Panel A), buy transactions make up 87.1% of all transactions in these stocks
in the three days period around the recommendation change. Conversely, for the 33.6%
of stocks downgraded to underperform (recommendation level 2), 83.1% (100%-16.9%) of
transactions are sells. The results in Panel B show a strong congruence between fund
managers’ trading decisions and buy-side recommendation revisions.
Figures 1 and 2 provide further evidence of the impact of BSA revisions on fund manager
trading. Both ﬁgures analyze trades in stocks around recommendation revisions. The event
(revision) day is t=0. Similarly to Panel B of Table 5, Figure 1 reports the proportion of
buys (in percentages) up to ﬁve weeks prior to and after the revision. The dark-shaded bars
show proportions of buys around upgrades, the light-shaded bars show buy proportions
around downgrades. Figure 2 looks at the trading intensity of fund managers around
recommendation revisions. It shows the average number of trades observed in a stock
around its revision day, again for upgrades (dark-shaded bars) and downgrades (light-
shaded bars) separately. In both ﬁgures, numbers are averaged on a daily basis for the ﬁrst
week around revisions. For weeks -5 to -2 and 2 to 5, the ﬁgure reports weekly averages.14
Additionally, the dashed line in each ﬁgure represents the average during weeks -5 to -2 for
both upgrades and downgrades.
Figure 1 shows that the congruence between recommendation revisions and fund man-
agers’ trades extends over a fairly long period. Recommendation upgrades (downgrades)
14The diﬀerence between weekly and daily averages is also highlighted in the ﬁgure by diﬀerent back-
ground shading.
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shift post-revision trades towards buys (sells) for at least three weeks, with weakening eﬀect
over time: The diﬀerence between the proportion of buys after upgrades versus downgrades
on revision days is over 80 percentage points and declines to roughly 25 percentage points
three weeks afterwards. Trading activity also increases around recommendation revisions,
as Figure 2 illustrates. On the revision days, average activity is almost ﬁve times higher
than the average activity in weeks -5 to -2 prior to revisions. However, the eﬀect appears
not to be long-lasting as it vanishes within the ﬁrst week following a revision. Both ﬁgures
strongly highlight the impact of BSAs’ recommendations on fund manager behavior.
A notable feature in Figures 1 and 2 is that the structure of transactions already changes
in the days prior to recommendation revisions. This is not surprising for trades happening
one to two days ahead of a revision: By the timing convention, a revision during trading
hours results in a lag of one day between the day a revision is known internally and the
formally recorded revision day. Additionally, analysts regularly communicate their planned
revisions to fund managers. Updating their valuation models and writing an accompany-
ing research report might then delay the oﬃcially recorded announcement by another day.
These eﬀects can best be seen in Figure 2 as the pick-up in trading activity is evident
two days ahead of the revision day. Figure 1, however, shows that the distribution of
buys and sells changes strongly even four days ahead of the revision. This pre-revision
eﬀect is unlikely to be due to time lags between an analyst’s decision to revise a recom-
mendation and the oﬃcial announcement. Rather, it is due to other interactions between
fund managers and BSAs. In particular, fund managers and BSAs share and discuss their
views about stocks. These discussions can be around speciﬁc events, such as company
meetings, company announcements, or institutionalized meetings between analysts and
fund managers.This may enable analysts to give an early indication of their plans to revise
a recommendation or may allow fund managers to correctly assess the direction of the
next revision. Alternatively, fund managers might be able to convince analysts to revise
recommendations while simply trading according to their own views. Although it is not dis-
cernible from the data which mechanism drives the pre-revision eﬀects, conversations with
fund managers and analysts suggest that revisions determine fund managers’ transactions
rather than vice versa.
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3.2 Explaining the direction of trades
The previous analysis suggests that buy-side recommendations have a strong eﬀect on
whether fund managers buy or sell a speciﬁc stock. Therefore, we look at this decision
in more detail. We ﬁrst show that BSA recommendation revisions and fund ﬂows have
a high impact on the trade direction even after controlling for other investment signals
and control variables. We then analyze whether BSA recommendations are more than a
compound signal of the set of public investment signals.
Table 6 presents the results of a logit regression of buys versus sells on various inter-
nal and publicly observable variables. The dependent variable takes on a value of 1 if a
stock transaction by a single mutual fund during a day is a buy transaction and 0 if the
transaction is a sell. The explanatory variables include the internal information about
BSA recommendations (both current levels and past changes) and cash ﬂow information.
For the publicly observable investment signals, we use consensus recommendations and
earnings estimates. We use the current levels of the consensus recommendation as well
as the value of past changes therein, distinguishing between three sub-periods within the
preceding six months to account for how recent the changes in the variable are. For the
consensus earnings estimates, we consider percentage changes over the same sub-periods
as for recommendations. The consensus variables provide a signal of the average analyst’s
recommended transaction and should take into account all relevant stock information up
to the day of transaction. In addition, we use recommendation revisions by key SSAs for
three sub-periods within the preceding month. We also include past stock returns as a
control variable. This variable captures potential momentum or contrarian trading by the
fund managers.
The results of the logit analysis show that all internal variables are highly statistically
signiﬁcant whereas only some of the public investment signals determine trading decisions.
Recommendation upgrades (downgrades) by either the buy-side or the sell-side (consensus
or key brokers) positively (negatively) aﬀect the propensity to buy a stock for all time
periods between the revision and the transaction considered here. The eﬀects of key SSA
revisions are statistically highly signiﬁcant for the more recent recommendation revisions
and decline over time. For consensus recommendations, only those changes that occur more
than a week prior to a transaction are statistically signiﬁcant. Hence, the key SSAs have a
very immediate eﬀect, whereas changes in the consensus matter only with some lag but do
so for a long period of time. Cash inﬂows also increase the probability of a buy transaction.
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This is as expected as fund managers usually prefer to hold only small cash positions. The
inﬂow of new money thus triggers at least some buy transactions. Recommendation levels
show less clear results. While they increase the propensity to buy when issued by BSAs,
higher consensus recommendation levels have an insigniﬁcant (and marginally negative)
eﬀect. This is consistent with fund managers considering recommendation changes to
contain investment value whereas the level of a recommendation is less relevant. Similar
to recommendation levels, past stock returns show no consistent eﬀects. While the most
recent returns positively aﬀect the propensity to buy, less recent returns have the reverse
eﬀect. Consensus earnings revisions have only weak eﬀects (if any at all) on the sign of
transactions, again with no consistent direction.
The last columns of Table 6 report the average marginal eﬀects of changes in the
explanatory variables. The results show that the internal signals have the highest economic
impact on trade directions. Most notably, a BSA’s recommendation upgrade (downgrade)
on the following, same, or previous day increases (decreases) the probability that fund
managers buy that stock by almost 43 percentage points. Although the eﬀect decreases
over time it is still economically high (close to 16 percentage points) if the revision happened
between two to four weeks before the transaction. As a comparison, the maximum eﬀect
that a similar change in the consensus recommendation has is 19.4 percentage points.
Although it generally depends on the coverage of a stock, a one-unit change in the consensus
within a single week is highly unlikely. The eﬀect of a two standard deviations change in
the consensus is about 3.7 percentage points (0.194×2×0.096). Nevertheless, the sell-side
information signal has an impact that persists even for periods of up to six months. Key
SSAs have a very immediate impact: A revision on the same or the preceding day shifts
the likelihood of a buy transaction by 7.1 percentage points. A cash ﬂow of one percent
of a fund’s asset value over the same or previous trading day changes the buy probability
by 16 percentage points in the same direction. The eﬀect is reduced to 4.8 percentage
points if the cash ﬂow occurs 5 to 3 days before the trading date. Finally, past returns
and recommendation levels, although statistically signiﬁcant, show low economic impact
on trade directions.
In order to further illustrate the eﬀect of buy-side analysts’ revisions, we allow for
diﬀerences in the eﬀects of upgrades and downgrades. For this analysis, we repeat the
above logit analysis, but replace the original BSA recommendation revision variables with
separate (positive) indicators for upgrades (versus no revision or a downgrade) and for
downgrades (versus no revision or an upgrade) occurring within the respective time periods.
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We present the results for these new indicators in Panel A of Table 7, thereby omitting the
results for the other explanatory variables used, as the results for these other variables are
only minimally diﬀerent to those in Table 6.
Both, BSA upgrades and downgrades aﬀect the direction of trades signiﬁcantly, with
opposite directions. Two particular patterns emerge from the separation of upgrades and
downgrades. First, the marginal eﬀects of upgrades are generally higher (in absolute terms)
than those of downgrades, given the same time period. Second, while the eﬀect of upgrades
is more immediate, the eﬀect of downgrades appears to be more persistent. For downgrades,
the eﬀect remains almost constant over the week preceding the transaction, and the decline
in the eﬀect for the period of four to one weeks before the transaction is also less pronounced
than for upgrades. Overall, while the eﬀect of upgrades and downgrades on transactions is
slightly diﬀerent, we can still conﬁrm that, irrespective of direction, BSA revisions are key
determinants of fund managers’ trading decisions.
3.3 The direction of buy-side analysts’ revisions
In order to gauge whether BSA recommendation revisions are more than a combination of
the public investment signals considered by fund managers, we now turn to the recommen-
dation upgrade or downgrade decision. Similar to the trade direction analysis, we perform
a logit regression of the direction of the stock recommendation revisions. The dependent
variable thus takes on a value of 1 (0) if the analyst upgrades (downgrades) the stock.
For the independent variables, we use the set of publicly observable variables (consensus
and key SSA recommendations, consensus earnings and returns) as in the analysis of trade
directions.
The results and average marginal eﬀects of the logit analysis are presented in Table 8.
Only few variables turn out to be statistically signiﬁcant (at the 10% level). The most
important variable in the analysis are the revisions by key SSAs. In comparison to the
transaction analysis, revisions by these key analysts relate to BSAs’ revisions more strongly
when happening almost at the same time: A recommendation upgrade by key SSAs in-
creases the likelihood that a BSA revision is an upgrade by 28.3 percentage points if it
happens on the same or previous day. If the sell-side upgrade happens up to a week ago,
the eﬀect is only weakly signiﬁcant with a marginal eﬀect of 11.6 percentage points, and is
insigniﬁcant for longer periods. In contrast to the key SSAs, consensus recommendations
are not statistically signiﬁcant. However, consensus earnings revisions have some, albeit
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limited, positive impact on the direction of BSA revisions. Finally, stock returns over the
prior week have a marginally signiﬁcant eﬀect. However, the overall eﬀects of past returns
are rather inconclusive as their direction changes over longer-term periods.
Based on the above eﬀects of external investment signals on BSA revisions, we analyze
whether these revisions still aﬀect transactions once the external variables have been taken
into account. For this, we create a BSA recommendation surprise variable, calculated as
the dependent variable in the logit of BSA revisions minus the predicted probability of
an upgrade derived from that model. We thus weigh any revision occurring by one minus
the expected probability of that revision, taking into account the direction of the revision.
For example, if the predicted probability of a revision being an upgrade is 60%, then the
surprise if the revision is indeed an upgrade is 40% (1 - 0.6), whereas if it is actually a
downgrade, then the surprise variable is -60% (0 - 0.6). We then repeat the earlier logit
analysis of transactions signs, replacing the BSA recommendation revision variables with
the surprise variable whenever a revision occurred within the relevant time period; absent
such a revision, the surprise variable is set to zero.
Panel B of Table 7 presents the results of the logit analysis of transaction signs on the
surprise part of a BSA revision. As in Panel A, we only report the results for the new BSA
suprise variables. The underlying analysis still includes the same set of other explanatory
variables as in Table 6, and the eﬀects of these other variables are qualitatively unchanged.
The results show a statistically and economically signiﬁcant eﬀect of the surprise component
of BSA revisions, again with a declining eﬀect over time. Hence, even after accounting for
the part of a revision that could have been expected given public information, BSA revisions
continue to have a strong impact on trading decisions.
In sum, our results suggest that BSAs’ recommendation revisions play an important
role as internal investment signals. Their impact is also larger than that of the sell-side
consensus. And even though BSAs and fund managers might partly follow similar invest-
ment signals, the recommendation revisions by BSAs can be shown to have additional
information content for the fund managers.
4 Performance impact
The previous results show that BSA and, to a lesser extent, key SSA recommendations
aﬀect trading decisions. We now consider the impact of analyst recommendations on fund
performance. Before analyzing the performance of fund transactions, we ﬁrst consider the
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performance of BSAs’ and key SSAs’ revisions. In the following, we restrict our sample to
those stocks that were covered by the BSAs at some time (i.e. where there is at least one
BSA recommendation) during January 2004 and December 2007. As a consequence, when
comparing the performance (and performance impact) of BSAs and key SSAs, we control
for a potential selection eﬀect due to diﬀerences in coverage between the buy-side and the
sell-side (see Groysberg et al., 2013).
4.1 The performance of analysts’ recommendation revisions
We measure BSA performance by calculating the percentage return of each stock upgrade
and downgrade for holding periods of one, ﬁve, 10, 15, 20, 40, 60 and 120 trading days as
of the day of the recommendation change. We report both raw returns as well as abnormal
returns. A stock’s abnormal return is computed as the diﬀerence between the raw return
and the stock’s expected return. Expected returns are the result of a regression of daily
stock returns on an intercept and the market return during the sample period. We use
the MSCI Europe index for the market return. Returns are averaged for all upgrades and
downgrades with equal weighting.
Table 9 presents the performance of BSA revisions as well as the diﬀerence in perfor-
mance between upgrades and downgrades. Looking at raw returns, Panel A shows that
stocks that have been upgraded have almost steadily increasing performance over time.
Even the returns to downgraded stocks turn positive and increase over time. The general
increase in stock prices is not overly surprising, given the time period of our analysis. How-
ever, the results also show that the return diﬀerence between recommendation upgrades
and downgrades is positive for all holding periods, and statistically signiﬁcant for the ﬁrst
two months. This return diﬀerence builds up from 0.5 to 1.0 percentage points over the
ﬁrst week and reaches a maximum of 2.5 percentage points after one month. A similar
structure of return diﬀerences is also visible in abnormal returns (Panel B). The diﬀerence
in abnormal returns between upgrades and downgrades increases from 0.56 to 2.01 per-
centage points within one month and decreases thereafter. Overall, BSA revisions contain
investment value which, statistically, can be conﬁrmed for holding periods of one to two
months.
We next consider the performance of the top 10 brokers’ analyst recommendation re-
visions. The logit analysis shows that very recent revisions by key SSAs positively aﬀect
fund manager transactions, even though the eﬀect is much weaker than for BSAs. Simi-
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larly to the analysis in Table 9, we calculate percentage returns of each stock upgraded and
downgraded by key SSAs for the various holding periods.15 Again, we measure the analyst
return based on the closing price on the revision day. This implies that we disregard the
potential announcement day eﬀect that has been found for SSA revisions (see Francis and
Soﬀer, 1997; Ivkovic and Jegadeesh, 2004). Although we thus miss out a part of the stock
return generally attributed to a revision, this lag in the performance calculation is more
relevant for fund managers as they are usually not able to react fast enough to realize the
announcement day return.
Table 10 presents the performance of key SSA upgrades and downgrades, the diﬀerence
in performance between these two revisions, as well as the diﬀerence in returns to revisions
by BSAs versus key SSAs in the last column pair.16 The results show that the key SSAs
also provide valuable investment recommendations. Both upgrades and downgrades show
statistically signiﬁcant positive and negative abnormal returns, respectively, over almost
all holding periods. Moreover, the return diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant over all
holding periods.
For both BSAs and key SSAs revisions, overall returns are positive and signiﬁcant over
at least one month. The comparison of the two groups in the last column pair of Table 10
shows that the returns (that is, the diﬀerence in returns between upgrades and downgrades)
to BSA revisions are on average higher than the returns to key SSA revisions, both in terms
of raw and abnormal returns. This result is statistically signiﬁcant for holding periods of
2 weeks to one month.
The fact that key SSA recommendations perform worse than those of BSAs might at
ﬁrst appear surprising: Typically, the sell-side would be expected to provide superior ser-
vices, given the strong incentives of higher pay, stricter performance evaluation, and tougher
job retention criteria at the sell-side (see Groysberg et al., 2008). However, Groysberg et al.
(2013) show that when restricting the analysis on stocks covered by both the buy-side and
the sell-side, the superior performance of SSAs’ buy recommendations vanishes. In our
analysis, we also focus on jointly covered stocks, and in addition to that consider the per-
formance contribution of both upgrades and downgrades. Adding the latter adds further
to the performance diﬀerence between BSAs and key SSAs.
15If there are multiple revisions on a day, the diﬀerence between the number of upgrades and downgrades
determines the revision direction; an equal number of upgrades and downgrades is interpreted as no
revision.
16We refer to the columns of returns and associated t-statistics as column pairs.
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Another important aspect of our analysis is that we focus on only a subset of the sell-
side. Given our interest on the impact of analysts on trading behavior and the performance
of trades (analyzed next), we select the key SSAs by their relevance for the sample funds,
measured in terms of coverage. This choice of sell-side ﬁrms might neglect other, more
capable SSAs. We will revisit this issue by analyzing the impact of a more quality-based
selection criterium on analyst performance and performance impact in section 4.3.
4.2 Performance of fund managers’ transactions
Given that BSAs and key SSAs generate valuable investment signals and that fund man-
agers appear to trade consistently with these signals, we should expect to see positive
performance of trades induced by these revisions. We now analyze fund managers’ trans-
actions and consider the returns to buy and sell transactions as well as return diﬀerences.
Tables 11 presents the performance of buy and sell transactions for three sub-samples of
fund transactions. The ﬁrst sample (in column pairs one and four) contains all transactions
where a recommendation revision by a BSA is observed in the period of one trading day
prior to one trading day after the transaction. From the analysis in section 3, we know that
these transactions are very likely to be driven by the internal investment signal. The second
set of trades (in column pairs two and ﬁve) consists of transactions for which a revision
by the set of key SSAs is observed on the day of trading or the previous day.17 The ﬁnal
transaction sample contains all trades which were not attributed to any of the previous
samples. This sample thus contains transactions that are not (solely) driven by BSA nor
key SSA recommendations but are possibly based on other information. We look at raw
(Panel A) and abnormal returns (Panel B) over the same time-horizons as in Tables 9 and
10. Although the funds in our sample have diﬀerent, fund-speciﬁc benchmarks (given their
diﬀerences in investment focus and style), we continue using the MSCI Europe index as the
market return. Unreported calculations using market-adjusted returns with fund-speciﬁc
benchmarks yield very similar results.
The results for the raw returns show again positive returns for both buys and sells over
the longer return periods. In addition, raw returns to buys are – with few exceptions –
positive and increasing in holding periods. Sell transactions triggered by BSA or key SSA
17There is a set of 104 transaction for which both BSA and key SSA revisions jointly occur within the
relevant time period. In the tables reported, these transactions are retained in both transaction samples.
Omitting them from both samples marginally lowers the average transaction returns, but leaves our overall
return comparisons and conclusions unaﬀected.
19
  
revisions produce negative returns during the ﬁrst month and then turn positive. Abnormal
returns, however, show a rather diﬀerent picture: Buy transactions triggered by BSAs or
key SSAs show hardly any statistically signiﬁcant returns, while the other buy transactions
produce statistically signiﬁcant and positive returns over a period of two months. Sell
transactions, on the other hand, produce statistically signiﬁcant negative abnormal returns
over almost all holding periods for all three transaction samples. Moreover, abnormal
returns to sell transactions following analyst revisions are rather sizable with below -2.5%
over the six month holding period. These results suggest that, when acting on analyst
revisions, our sample ﬁrm’s fund managers are particularly good in identifying proﬁtable
selling opportunities, and rather weak in identifying proﬁtable buying opportunities.
Table 12 analyzes return diﬀerences between buy and sell transactions for our three
samples, focusing on the diﬀerences in abnormal returns.18 In Panel A, the ﬁrst three
column pairs present the absolute return diﬀerences for the sample of BSA induced trades,
key SSA induced trades, and all other trades, respectively. The results show that return
diﬀerences to BSA induced trades as well as other trades are positive and statistically
signiﬁcant for holding periods of up to two months. For trades around key SSA revisions,
returns are also positive, but statistically signiﬁcant only for holding periods of up to one
month.
While all transaction samples show positive return diﬀerences between buys and sells,
our results also suggest that transactions following BSA revisions provide higher returns
than trades from any of the other two samples. The fourth column pair in Panel A of
Table 12 compares return diﬀerences for trades triggered by BSAs versus key SSAs, and
the last column pair compares BSA induced trades with the sample of all other trades.
In both comparisons, the return diﬀerences to BSA induced trades are positive. The
diﬀerences in abnormal return diﬀerences between the BSA and key SSA induced samples
is statistically signiﬁcant for holding periods of up to two weeks. When compared with
all other trades, BSA induced trades provide statistically signiﬁcant superior abnormal
returns for all holding periods considered. These comparisons show that the performance
impact of BSAs to fund performance, alongside the earlier trading impact, is positive. In
addition, the higher performance of BSA revisions relative to key SSA revisions recorded
earlier appears to induce a performance impact on transactions that is also slightly higher
for BSAs than for key SSAs. We will later analyze whether this result is robust to an
18The results from looking at diﬀerences in raw returns are very similar and therefore not presented
here.
20
  
alternative selection of sell-side ﬁrms.
Panel B of Table 12 provides some further information on the source of the performance
impact of BSAs and key SSAs to fund performance. In this analysis, we split the two sets
of analyst induced trades by whether the transactions actually follow the analyst revision
(congruent trades, column pairs one and two) or go against the revision (contrarian trades,
column pairs three and four). The table then reports the diﬀerence in abnormal returns
between buys and sells for the four samples. As can be seen in the last row of Panel B,
our fund managers follow key SSAs more often than not, but a large proportion of trades
still is contrary to the revisions. On the other hand, only relatively few transactions go
against BSA revisions, again illustrating the high impact of these revisions. Looking at
the performance of trades shows that trading against analyst revisions does not produce
positive returns. Rather, the performance to contrarian trades over the shorter term (one
to three weeks) is signiﬁcantly negative and insigniﬁcant thereafter. On the other hand,
returns to congruent trades produce high positive returns which are statistically signiﬁcant
for holding periods of up to two and three months for BSA induced and key SSA induced
transactions, respectively. Hence, while analyst revisions are valuable input to the sample
fund managers, these managers do not show speciﬁc abilities in separating proﬁtable and
unproﬁtable revisions. This ﬁnding is similar to the ﬁnding in Busse et al. (2012) that US
fund managers are unable to identify proﬁtable and unproﬁtable SSA recommendations.
Our results suggest that this pattern may even hold when considering revisions by internal
analysts.
4.3 Performance impact of highly ranked sell-side analysts
Our results for both analyst revisions as well as transactions attributable to analyst re-
visions suggest that BSAs have a slightly more positive eﬀect on returns than key SSAs,
although the ﬁnding is only statistically signiﬁcant for return periods of up to 1 month.
One of the reasons for the results could be that by selecting key sell-side ﬁrms by their cov-
erage, we are selecting a set of analysts with lower abilities.19 Fang and Yasuda (2013), for
example, show that analyst abilities diﬀer signiﬁcantly, leading to sizable diﬀerences in re-
turns to recommendations by analysts of high or low abilities. Moreover, the authors show
that higher-ability analysts can be identiﬁed by their ranking in the yearly Institutional
Investor magazine.
19We are grateful for a reviewer for drawing our attention to this aspect.
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In order to analyze the eﬀect of our selection of key SSAs, we repeat the performance
analysis of sections 4.1 and 4.2 using a set of sell-side ﬁrms selected according to their
industry ranking. Speciﬁcally, we select analysts from all sell-side ﬁrms that were ranked
among the top 5 based on their overall research strength in the October issues of the
Institutional Investor magazine in 2004, 2005, and 2006. As these rankings are relatively
stable over time, we thus ended up with analysts from six diﬀerent sell-side ﬁrms.20 Table 13
presents the results of our analyses.
Panel A of Table 13 reports the abnormal returns to SSA revisions and diﬀerences
therein for the set of highly ranked SSAs, similar to Table 10, Panel B’s presentation of the
returns to key SSA revisions. The ﬁnal column pair correspondingly compares the return
diﬀerences between BSA and highly ranked SSA revisions. The results suggest that the
new selection of SSA ﬁrms does not yield a performance improvement for SSA revisions.
Rather, it appears that the selected set of analysts performs slightly worse than the key
SSAs selected by coverage. This is particularly visible in the weak and even negative
(although statistically insigniﬁcant) performance of upgrades.
Looking at the impact on transaction performance, on the other hand, suggests that
following highly ranked SSAs more positively aﬀects performance. Panel B of Table 13
presents abnormal return diﬀerences for the three transaction samples (BSA induced trans-
actions, SSA induced transactions, and other transactions) when we consider the highly
ranked set of sell-side ﬁrms. Comparing the return diﬀerences for transactions induced by
highly ranked SSAs with those induced by key SSAs (as reported in Panel A of Table 12),
we ﬁnd that the return diﬀerences for highly ranked SSAs are all higher except for the
1-day return period, and remain statistically signiﬁcant and positive over all return peri-
ods longer than one week. As a result, the performance diﬀerences between BSA and SSA
driven transactions, albeit still positive, also decreases and is only signiﬁcantly positive for
BSAs for a period of up to one week.
Overall, our results suggests that the method of selecting the relevant set of SSAs
20As the ﬁrm rankings used are based on the performance of analysts in the US market, we implicitly
assume that the reputation and ability of sell-side ﬁrms carry over into the European markets as well.
We also repeated the analysis with the set of top 5 sell-side ﬁrms from the 2003 All-Europe Research
Team ranking, published in the February 2003 Institutional Investor magazine. Three sell-side ﬁrms are
represented in both sets of ﬁrms. Also, the results based on the European ranking are qualitatively the
same as those presented here. As the 2003 All-Europe Research Team ranking was the only European-
focused ranking close to our sample period while the US rankings were more frequent and cover the entire
sample period, we chose the latter rankings for the results presented.
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has an eﬀect on analysts’ performance and their performance impact on fund managers.
Moreover, the above results also indicate that the impact on fund manager performance
and the performance of SSA revisions might be aﬀected diﬀerently by the selection of SSAs.
On the other hand, our key result about the relevance of BSAs appears suﬃciently robust
to the choice of SSAs. These ﬁndings suggest that, generally, further research is warranted
into the relationship between analysts’ performance, ability, and their impact via active
investors’ decisions.
5 Trading proﬁts and the value of buy-side analysts
Our results show that BSAs positively aﬀect fund manager trading and the performance
of their trades. However, the performance impact so far depends on the holding period
considered. We now provide a more concrete, albeit rough, estimate of the value of BSAs
for the asset management ﬁrm. To do so, we calculate realized trading proﬁts for round-trip
transactions that were likely to be initialized by BSAs. We select all transactions in stocks
that had a same-directional revision in the period of one day prior to one day after the
transaction. We then eliminate all transactions which afterwards had no oﬀsetting trades
by the same fund until the end of our sample period. For the remaining transactions,
we calculate round-trip raw proﬁts using reported execution prices. As an illustration,
consider a BSA-induced buy of 100 shares in stock X at a price of 1 at date 0. The
transaction is oﬀset by sells at two distinct dates: 60 shares of X are sold at a price of
2 at date 1, and 40 shares are sold at a price of 1.5 at date 2. The round-trip proﬁt is
hence 80. The same proﬁt results if 100 shares are sold at date 2 (the fund might have
already had a position in X at date 0) – only the sale of 40 shares is needed to close the
position. Thus, oﬀsetting transactions need not be contained in a single trade and might
be part of an even larger trade. Also, subsequent transactions other than oﬀsetting trades
are disregarded until the position is closed: The trading proﬁts in the example remain
unaﬀected by additional purchases of X between date 0 and date 2. We thus assume that
the BSA-induced transaction is always closed ﬁrst.
We provide several adjustments to the raw proﬁts generated by the round-trip trans-
actions. Market-adjusted proﬁts are derived by deducting the proﬁts from equal-sized
investments into the MSCI Europe index on the transaction day. Investment returns from
this hypothetical portfolio are realized at the same point(s) in time as the stock investment.
In order to account for the stock-speciﬁc risk, we also calculate beta-adjusted proﬁts by
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adjusting the investment into the market index by the stock’s beta. Finally, we derive
proﬁts when transactions are executed without transaction costs and net of transaction
costs. Transaction costs for stocks are included in our data set, and we use transaction
costs of 5 basis points for investments into the hypothetical index portfolio.
Table 14 presents the results for the proﬁts from 349 round-trip transactions following
BSA revisions. The average raw return before transaction costs amounts to about e 110,000
or a total proﬁt of e 38.4 million during the 3.5 years of the sample. Transaction costs
reduce this proﬁt by almost e 4 million. Adjusted proﬁts are considerably lower, with
beta-adjusted proﬁts being at the lowest level. Net of transaction costs, beta-adjusted
proﬁts amount to e 4.5 million a year.
As transaction proﬁts at ﬁrst accrue to mutual fund investors, we need an estimate
for the proﬁts these transactions generate for the asset management ﬁrm. For this, we
assume that the trading proﬁt generated in a year is invested in the market portfolio and
yearly pays out management fees. Discounting the inﬁnite stream of fee income yields a net
present value for the asset management ﬁrm. Writing this net present value as a fraction
of the one-period trading proﬁt gives
NPVBSA
πt
=
∞∑
t=0
f
(
(1− f)(1 + rM)
1 + rd
)t
=
f(1 + rd)
rd + f − rM(1− f) ,
where πt denotes the trading proﬁt, f the management fee, rM the return on the market
portfolio and rd the discount rate. Using the CAPM for the discount rate, we can write
rd = rf + β(rM − rf ) with rf as the risk-free rate. The mutual funds in our sample charge
management fees between 1.5% and 2.0% of assets. We use a risk-free rate of 3%, an equity
premium of 5.5% (see e.g. Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton, 2008) and a “ﬁnancials”β of 1.3.
Running the numbers results in a net present value which is between 50.4% and 57.7% of
the trading proﬁt.21 Hence, the value of the buy-side analysts would be between e 2.27
and e 2.60 million per year.
During the sample period, the asset management ﬁrm employed between 18 and 23
research analyst at various experience levels. Assuming an average yearly cost per analyst
of e 400,000 (approximately US$ 500,000 to 550,000) and employment of 20 analysts
implies that the value of these analysts as derived above only amounts to 28% to 33%
of their costs. By these estimates, the proﬁts generated by BSAs would fall signiﬁcantly
21Varying the risk-free rate between 2% and 4%, the equity premium between 4% and 7% and β between
1.1 and 1.5 results in a NPV range between 33% and 82% of trading proﬁts.
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short of their costs. However, the value generation estimates should be interpreted as a
lower bound to the value of BSAs, and are likely to be higher for various reasons. For
example, not all transactions that are likely to be induced by BSAs are included in the
proﬁt calculation of Table 14. For some BSA-induced transactions there were no oﬀsetting
trades. Moreover, institutional portfolios managed by the same group of fund managers
are not included in the data.
Another important reason why our estimate is likely to be too low arises from two
potential revenue eﬀects of BSAs. First, BSAs might induce further inﬂows: As investors
prefer to invest into better-performing funds (see e.g. Ippolito, 1992; Chevalier and Ellison,
1997), fund returns enhanced by BSAs also yield higher inﬂows. Second, with BSAs adding
to the performance of its mutual funds, the asset management ﬁrm might be able to charge
higher management fees than it would be able to charge without BSAs. Depending on the
competitive environment of the market for its mutual funds, this implies that the value
created would be higher than just the additional fee income derived from the trading proﬁt
(see Luo, 2002, for both a theoretical model and empirical evidence for mark-up pricing by
mutual funds). Under a less than perfectly competitive environment, a positive proportion
of the trading proﬁt would be skimmed oﬀ by the asset manager.
In sum, even though our simple estimate of the value of BSAs falls short of their costs,
there are various reasons why we potentially underestimate the value of BSAs. However,
in particular the indirect eﬀects of BSAs on fund revenues on assets are hard to gauge.
Hence, as the directly measurable value generated by BSAs appears too low, our results
show that the value generation process in asset management remains an interesting and
important research area.
6 Conclusion
Equity research analysts provide ﬁnancial market information that can be sold in two
ways, directly and indirectly (see Admati and Pﬂeiderer, 1988, 1990; Biais and Germain,
2002). Sell-side analysts are direct sellers of information whereas buy-side analysts and as-
set managers sell their information indirectly. In many asset management ﬁrms, the task of
gathering and producing investment information and the task of making investment deci-
sions are separated. Fund managers may hence rely on both information sources and decide
for themselves on the use of the information. This paper analyzes how fund managers use
private (buy-side) and public (sell-side) information by directly linking recommendations
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from both sources to transactions.
Our results show that fund managers react most strongly to recommendation changes by
buy-side analysts. Jegadeesh et al. (2004) have already documented that the information
content of sell-side stock recommendations is highest in recommendation changes. The
response by fund managers suggests that the same is true for buy-side recommendations.
Additionally, the private nature of buy-side recommendations probably ensures that prices
will not (instantly) reﬂect the information. It is thus more proﬁtable to respond to a signal
if it is private. The higher impact of buy-side recommendations, particularly in comparison
with the sell-side consensus, found in our analysis is consistent with this interpretation.
The analysis of the returns to buy-side analyst recommendations shows that following
buy-side analysts’ revisions can be proﬁtable for fund managers. Transactions triggered by
buy-side analyst revisions yield positive abnormal returns that exceed those of other trans-
actions. In sum, the behavior of fund managers and the impact of buy-side analysts found
in the analysis accords well with models of investment decisions and market microstructure
under public and private information.
Since our data come from a single ﬁrm, our results are clearly not generally applicable
to the overall asset management industry. However, our results show a consistency of
the sample ﬁrm’s business model of using sell-side information while at the same time
employing buy-side analysts. As this is a widely adopted business model, our analysis can
be of interest to other ﬁrms in the industry as well as fund investors.
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Figure 1: Percentage of buy transactions around BSA recommendation revisions
This ﬁgure reports the average proportion of buys (in percentages) in a stock around the day (t=0) a BSA
revises the stock’s recommendation. The dark-shaded bars show buy proportions around upgrades, the
light-shaded bars show buy proportions around downgrades. Averages are taken on a daily basis for the
ﬁrst week around revisions (white background). For weeks -5 to -2 and 2 to 5, the ﬁgure reports weekly
averages (shaded background). The dashed line denotes the average for upgrades and downgrades over
weeks -5 to -2.
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Figure 2: Trading activity around BSA recommendation revisions
This ﬁgure reports the average number of trades in a stock around the day (t=0) a BSA revises the stock’s
recommendation. The dark-shaded bars show the number of trades around upgrades, the light-shaded bars
show number of trades around downgrades. Averages are taken on a daily basis for the ﬁrst week around
revisions (white background). For weeks -5 to -2 and 2 to 5, the ﬁgure reports weekly averages (shaded
background). The dashed line denotes the average for upgrades and downgrades over weeks -5 to -2.
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Table 1: Fund characteristics relative to the universe of same-category funds
This table reports characteristics for 13 of the 14 sample funds based on data from Morningstar websites
collected in October 2008. (One sample fund is unavailable in the data due to its closure in 2007.) The
table reports the number of sample funds falling into each quintile of their respective fund category as
classiﬁed by Morningstar. The total number of funds used in the comparison is 697.
Number of funds in category quintile
(lowest) 1 2 3 4 5 (highest)
Assets under management 0 0 6 4 3
Total expense ratio 0 3 5 0 5
Average market capitalization of portfolio ﬁrms 2 5 2 1 3
5-year fund performance 2 5 2 4 0
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Table 2: Structure of recommendations by BSAs and key SSAs
This table reports information about recommendations by BSAs and key SSAs over the sample period 2004
to 2007. Key SSAs are those employed by the top 10 brokers with highest overlap of their coverage with
the stocks held by the buy-side ﬁrm. The data is aggregated at broker level and presented as means over
brokers with rank 1 to 5 (column SSAs Top 1-5 ) and brokers with rank 6 to 10 (column SSAs Top 6-10 ).
The ﬁrst ﬁve rows report the distribution of recommendations (as a percentage of all recommendations
by that analyst group). Rows six to eight report the mean recommendation, the underlying number of
recommendations, and the total number of analysts, respectively. The ﬁnal row reports the number of
distinct stocks for which recommendations are available that are also held by the buy-side ﬁrm.
BSAs SSAs Top 1-5 SSAs Top 6-10
1 (sell) 0.4 3.2 4.2
2 (underperform) 15.4 15.1 14.0
3 (hold) 41.8 38.3 42.8
4 (buy) 36.6 32.5 25.3
5 (strong buy) 5.7 11.0 13.8
Mean recommendation 3.32 3.33 3.31
No. of recommendations 803 1300 1068
No. of analysts 40 199 136
Relevant coverage 319 456 386
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for the transactions sample
This table reports summary statistics for the ﬁnal sample of stock transactions between January 2004 and
December 2007. Buy transactiont indicates whether the transaction is a buy (1) or sell (0), with t as the
day of the transaction. BSA recommendationt denotes the buy-side recommendation level of the stock
on day t. BSA recommendation revisionτ,τ−i is an indicator whether the BSA stock recommendation has
been reduced (-1), increased (+1), or is unchanged (0) within the period τ − i to τ . Cash Flowτ,τ−i is the
sum of daily net cash ﬂows (in percent of fund assets) of the fund trading the stock over the period τ − i
to τ . Key SSA recommendation revisionτ,τ−i is an indicator whether the diﬀerence between the number
of upgrades and downgrades by key SSAs within the period τ − i to τ is negative (-1), positive (+1), or
zero (0, also indicating no revisions). Key SSAs are those employed by the top 10 brokers with highest
overlap of their coverage with the stocks covered and traded by the buy-side ﬁrm. Cons. recommendationt
denotes the consensus recommendation level of the stock on day t. Cons. recommendation revisionτ,τ−i is
the diﬀerence between the consensus recommendation value in τ and its value in τ − i− 1. Cons. earnings
revisionτ,τ−i is the percentage change in the absolute weighted consensus earnings forecast between τ and
τ − i− 1, winsorized at ±100%. Returnτ,τ−i is the percentage change between the closing stock price in τ
and τ − i− 1. Recommendations are coded from 1 for “sell” to 5 for “strong buy”.
Variable Mean Median StdDev Min Max
Buy transactiont 0.361 0.000 0.480 0.0 1.0
BSA recommendationt 3.634 4.000 0.707 1.0 5.0
BSA recommendation revisiont+1,t−1 -0.001 0.000 0.155 -1.0 1.0
BSA recommendation revisiont−2,t−5 -0.001 0.000 0.128 -1.0 1.0
BSA recommendation revisiont−6,t−20 -0.003 0.000 0.209 -1.0 1.0
Cash Flowt,t−1 -0.180 -0.087 2.420 -40.8 24.9
Cash Flowt−2,t−5 -0.445 -0.183 2.180 -40.7 25.2
Key SSA recommendation revisiont,t−1 -0.002 0.000 0.232 -1.0 1.0
Key SSA recommendation revisiont−2,t−5 0.004 0.000 0.291 -1.0 1.0
Key SSA recommendation revisiont−6,t−20 0.012 0.000 0.502 -1.0 1.0
Cons. recommendationt 3.672 3.710 0.381 2.2 4.8
Cons. recommendation revisiont,t−5 0.001 0.000 0.058 -1.0 0.6
Cons. recommendation revisiont−6,t−20 0.003 0.000 0.096 -1.0 1.0
Cons. recommendation revisiont−21,t−120 0.037 0.040 0.227 -1.1 1.1
Cons. earnings revisiont,t−5 0.393 0.000 4.430 -100.0 100.0
Cons. earnings revisiont−6,t−20 1.040 0.000 6.564 -100.0 100.0
Cons. earnings revisiont−21,t−120 6.594 5.889 17.785 -100.0 100.0
Returnt−1,t−5 0.218 0.212 4.289 -56.2 41.0
Returnt−6,t−20 1.196 1.192 6.008 -58.2 44.5
Returnt−21,t−120 7.584 7.065 15.005 -67.6 160.4
No. of observations 19,614
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Table 5: The distribution of BSA recommendation revisions and associated transactions
This table reports in Panel A the distribution of BSA recommendation revisions for each prior recommen-
dation level. The last column of Panel A shows the distribution of all prior recommendations. Panel B
reports the percentage of buy transactions in stocks with a BSA recommendation revision by prior and
new recommendation. Percentages are calculated for all transactions in the stock in the period one trad-
ing day prior to one trading day after the recommendation revision. nt denotes revisions which have no
transactions associated with them. Recommendations are coded from 1 for “sell” to 5 for “strong buy”.
Panel A: BSA recommendation revisions: Transition matrix (%)
to recommendation
from rec. 1 2 3 4 5 Sample (%)
1 . 50.0 50.0 . . 0.3
2 0.9 . 81.7 15.6 1.8 16.3
3 0.4 33.6 . 65.3 0.8 39.7
4 0.4 7.8 78.8 . 13.1 36.7
5 . . 23.4 76.6 . 7.0
No. of revisions: 668
Panel B: Buy percentage around recommendation revisions
to recommendation
from rec. 1 2 3 4 5
1 . nt 100.0 . .
2 nt . 72.9 88.5 100.0
3 0.0 16.9 . 87.1 100.0
4 0.0 25.0 7.9 . 71.0
5 . . 8.3 11.8 .
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Table 6: Logit analysis of transaction sign
This table reports parameter estimates and average marginal eﬀects for the logit analysis of fund managers’
trading direction. The dependent variable is Buy transactiont which takes on a value of 1 (0) if the
transaction on day t is a buy (sell). The explanatory variables are described in Table 3. Recommendations
are coded from 1 for“sell”to 5 for“strong buy”. The Unit column presents the unit of the change underlying
the marginal eﬀect calculation, with pp denoting percentage points. t-statistics are given in brackets. The
R2 reported is McFadden’s pseudo R2. ***, **, and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.
Marginal Eﬀects
Variable Estimate t-stat Unit Eﬀect t-stat
(Intercept) -0.310* [-1.88] na na na
BSA recommendationt 0.043* [ 1.77] 1 0.009 [ 1.61]
BSA recommendation revisiont+1,t−1 2.129*** [14.74] 1 0.428 [13.37]
BSA recommendation revisiont−2,t−5 1.252*** [ 8.76] 1 0.252 [ 7.94]
BSA recommendation revisiont−6,t−20 0.780*** [ 9.60] 1 0.157 [ 8.70]
Cash Flowt,t−1 0.795*** [22.64] 1% 0.160 [20.65]
Cash Flowt−2,t−5 0.240*** [13.10] 1% 0.048 [11.98]
Key SSA recommendation revisiont,t−1 0.356*** [ 5.07] 1 0.071 [ 4.59]
Key SSA recommendation revisiont−2,t−5 0.131** [ 2.36] 1 0.026 [ 2.13]
Key SSA recommendation revisiont−6,t−20 0.076** [ 2.29] 1 0.015 [ 2.07]
Cons. recommendationt -0.072 [-1.54] 1 -0.014 [-1.40]
Cons. recommendation revisiont,t−5 0.259 [ 0.91] 1 0.052 [ 0.82]
Cons. recommendation revisiont−6,t−20 0.965*** [ 5.54] 1 0.194 [ 5.02]
Cons. recommendation revisiont−21,t−120 0.221*** [ 3.00] 1 0.044 [ 2.72]
Cons. earnings revisiont,t−5 0.005 [ 1.38] 1% 0.001 [ 1.25]
Cons. earnings revisiont−6,t−20 -0.005** [-2.22] 1% -0.001 [-2.01]
Cons. earnings revisiont−21,t−120 0.002** [ 2.12] 1% 0.000 [ 1.92]
Returnt−1,t−5 0.008** [ 2.17] 1% 0.002 [ 1.97]
Returnt−6,t−20 -0.012*** [-4.38] 1% -0.002 [-3.97]
Returnt−21,t−120 -0.004*** [-4.08] 1% -0.001 [-3.69]
R2 0.1113
No. of observations 19,614
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Table 7: Transaction impact of alternative BSA revision variables
This table reports parameter estimates and average marginal eﬀects for alternative speciﬁcations of the
BSA revision variables resulting from logit analyses of fund managers’ trading decisions as in Table 6.
The dependent variable is Buy transactiont which takes on a value of 1 (0) if the transaction on day t
is a buy (sell). In Panel A, BSA recommendation upgradeτ,τ−i is an indicator whether the BSA stock
recommendation has been increased (1) or not increased (0) within the period τ − i to τ , while BSA
recommendation downgradeτ,τ−i is an indicator whether the BSA recommendation has been decreased (1)
or not decreased (0) within that period. In Panel B, BSA recommendation surpriseτ,τ−i is equal to 1 for
an upgrade and 0 for a downgrade revision minus the predicted probability of an upgrade in the stock’s
recommendation (derived from the logit analysis underlying Table 8) if the revision occurred within the
period τ− i to τ , and zero else. Both logit analyses also include the same set of other explanatory variables
as in the analysis of Table 6. Recommendations are coded from 1 for“sell” to 5 for “strong buy”. t-statistics
are given in brackets. The R2 reported is McFadden’s pseudo R2. ***, **, and * denote signiﬁcance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Logit analysis with BSA upgrades and downgrades separated
Marginal Eﬀects
Variable Estimate t-stat Eﬀect t-stat
BSA recommendation upgradet+1,t−1 2.452*** [12.79] 0.522 [ 21.16]
BSA recommendation upgradet−2,t−5 1.086*** [ 6.09] 0.263 [ 6.14]
BSA recommendation upgradet−6,t−20 0.856*** [ 7.90] 0.207 [ 7.70]
BSA recommendation downgradet+1,t−1 -1.598*** [-7.53] -0.244 [-13.36]
BSA recommendation downgradet−2,t−5 -1.558*** [-6.05] -0.240 [-10.58]
BSA recommendation downgradet−6,t−20 -0.684*** [-5.65] -0.133 [ -6.71]
R2 0.1117
No. of observations 19,614
Panel B: Logit analysis using the surprise in BSA revisions
Marginal Eﬀects
Variable Estimate t-stat Eﬀect t-stat
BSA recommendation surpriset+1,t−1 4.379*** [13.39] 0.882 [12.15]
BSA recommendation surpriset−2,t−5 2.552*** [ 8.77] 0.514 [ 7.96]
BSA recommendation surpriset−6,t−20 1.415*** [ 8.72] 0.285 [ 7.92]
R2 0.1094
No. of observations 19,550
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Table 8: Logit analysis of BSA recommendation revisions
This table reports parameter estimates and average marginal eﬀects for the logit analysis of buy-side
analysts’ recommendation revisions. The dependent variable is the direction of the recommendation change
and equals 1 (0) for an upgrade (downgrade). t denotes the day of the recommendation change. The
explanatory variables are described in Table 3. Recommendations are coded from 1 for “sell” to 5 for
“strong buy”. The Unit column presents the unit of the change underlying the marginal eﬀect calculation,
with pp denoting percentage points. t-statistics are given in brackets. The R2 reported is McFadden’s
pseudo R2. ***, **, and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Marginal Eﬀects
Variable Estimate t-stat Unit Eﬀect t-stat
(Intercept) 0.053 [ 0.06] na na na
Key SSA recommendation revisiont,t−1 1.213*** [ 3.43] 1 0.283 [ 3.22]
Key SSA recommendation revisiont−2,t−5 0.498* [ 1.69] 1 0.116 [ 1.58]
Key SSA recommendation revisiont−6,t−20 0.251 [ 1.38] 1 0.059 [ 1.30]
Cons. recommendationt -0.052 [-0.22] 1 -0.012 [-0.20]
Cons. recommendation revisiont,t−5 1.227 [ 1.02] 1 0.286 [ 0.96]
Cons. recommendation revisiont−6,t−20 -0.129 [-0.13] 1 -0.030 [-0.12]
Cons. recommendation revisiont−21,t−120 0.216 [ 0.54] 1 0.050 [ 0.51]
Cons. earnings revisiont,t−5 0.033 [ 1.34] 1% 0.008 [ 1.26]
Cons. earnings revisiont−6,t−20 0.036* [ 1.93] 1% 0.008 [ 1.81]
Cons. earnings revisiont−21,t−120 0.001 [ 0.10] 1% 0.000 [ 0.10]
Returnt−1,t−5 0.032* [ 1.91] 1% 0.008 [ 1.79]
Returnt−6,t−20 -0.026 [-1.65] 1% -0.006 [-1.55]
Returnt−21,t−120 -0.007 [-1.18] 1% -0.002 [-1.10]
R2 0.0485
No. of observations 539
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Table 9: Performance of BSA revisions
This table reports % returns of stocks upgraded and downgraded by the buy-side analysts as well as the
diﬀerence in returns (in percentage points). t-statistics are given in brackets. Stock returns are calculated
using closing prices, starting with the closing price on the event day, and are averaged over each return
period. Panel A reports raw returns, Panel B reports abnormal returns using expected returns from a
market model with the MSCI Europe index as the market index.
Upgrades Downgrades Diﬀerence
Returns t-stat Returns t-stat Returns t-stat
Panel A: Raw returns
1 Day 0.171 [ 1.49] -0.282 [ -2.25] 0.453 [ 2.67]
1 week 0.598 [ 2.61] -0.403 [ -1.75] 1.001 [ 3.08]
2 weeks 1.560 [ 5.11] -0.414 [ -1.25] 1.974 [ 4.38]
3 weeks 2.062 [ 5.25] -0.164 [ -0.51] 2.226 [ 4.40]
1 month 2.018 [ 4.78] -0.510 [ -1.42] 2.527 [ 4.56]
2 months 2.792 [ 4.60] 0.955 [ 1.85] 1.837 [ 2.31]
3 months 3.405 [ 4.51] 1.658 [ 2.52] 1.747 [ 1.74]
6 months 5.758 [ 5.59] 4.177 [ 4.81] 1.581 [ 1.17]
Panel B: Abnormal returns
1 Day 0.192 [ 1.91] -0.371 [ -3.14] 0.563 [ 3.63]
1 week 0.448 [ 2.25] -0.417 [ -2.12] 0.865 [ 3.09]
2 weeks 0.874 [ 3.22] -0.681 [ -2.36] 1.555 [ 3.93]
3 weeks 0.995 [ 2.88] -0.803 [ -2.99] 1.798 [ 4.12]
1 month 0.816 [ 2.19] -1.193 [ -3.97] 2.009 [ 4.19]
2 months 0.408 [ 0.70] -0.955 [ -2.14] 1.363 [ 1.86]
3 months -0.167 [ -0.23] -1.291 [ -2.28] 1.124 [ 1.23]
6 months -0.293 [ -0.30] -1.199 [ -1.58] 0.906 [ 0.74]
No. of revisions 310 344
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  Table 14: Proﬁts generated by BSA-induced round-trip transactions
This table reports the average realized trading proﬁt for round-trip transactions. The transactions used
are those with same-directional BSA recommendation revision -1 to +1 trading days around the initial
trade date that also have subsequent transactions reverting the initial trade. Proﬁts are calculated without
market adjustment (Raw proﬁts), adjusted for an equal investment in the MSCI Europe index (Market-
adjusted proﬁts) and for a beta-adjusted investment into the MSCI Europe index (β-adjusted proﬁts).
Stock prices used are reported transaction prices. Proﬁts are calculated both gross and net of transaction
costs. Transaction costs applied to the benchmark or risk-adjusted benchmark investment are 5 basis
points. t-statistics are given in brackets.
Gross of transaction costs Net of transaction costs
Mean (e) t-stat Mean (e) t-stat
Raw proﬁts 110,043 [2.55] 98,996 [2.30]
Market-adjusted proﬁts 77,596 [1.87] 69,454 [1.67]
β-adjusted proﬁts 53,342 [1.41] 45,245 [1.19]
No. of round-trips 349
45
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Highlights: 
- We present evidence on the trading and performance impact of buy-side analysts. 
- Fund managers strongly follow recent recommendation revisions. 
- Trades triggered by buy-side recommendations have higher returns than other trades.  
- The impact of buy-side analysts is more pronounced than that of sell-side analysts. 
